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The football industry has been subject of exponential growth, particularly over 
the past decade, mainly related with the expansion to Asian and North 
American markets, which only recently started to pay attention to the sport. 
Manchester United has been capitalizing its brand awareness, and investing in 
well-known players, as part of its growing strategy. The return of the club into 
the Champions League, together with the new commencement of the Adidas 
partnership, provide a good outlook for the seasons to come. 
Also, revenues are expected to grow considerably in result of the negotiation of 
both the UEFA Champions League and Premier League broadcasting rights, 
with the Management of Manchester United intending to keep pursuing the 
strategy to stabilize the club’s debt level and increase financial flexibility. 
In the seasons to come, revenues are expected to stabilize at circa £600 and 
Adjusted EBITDA at circa £200M, meaning a Net Debt / EBITDA ratio of circa 
1.4x. 
Hence, the author finds Manchester United’s shares to be a great investment 
opportunity, an opinion shared by J. P. Morgan’s Head of UK Small and Mid-
Cap Research Team. 
 
 







Company Information (30th June 
2016): 
Equity Value: £1.946M 
Net Debt & NOAL: £(252)M 
# Shares: 164M 
Market Quote: 11.9£  
52-week range: £10.6 – £13.7 
 
J. P. Morgan Valuation (30th June 
2016): 
Target Price: £14.5  
Recommendation: Buy 
Outlook 2017:  
- Revenue ~ £535M 





|Manchester United PLC | Equity Research  
Price Performance (Excess Returns vs. 
Benchmark) 
Disclaimer 
All information contained in this document is public and based on market research, the company’s website 
and/or Management and J. P. Morgan’s comments. The author cannot, under any circumstances, be held 
responsible regarding the reliability, accuracy or extent of information provided in this document, which is 
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Abstract (English)  
The purpose of this thesis is to issue a buy or sell recommendation for Manchester United’s shares, as of 30th 
June 2016. To do so, different valuation methodologies may be applied. The author decided to use Discounted 
Cash Flows and Multiples. The first, due to its flexibility to build different scenarios (in a case of a football 
club linked to sports performance) and because Manchester United is expected to sustain its D/E ratio. The 
second was useful to triangulate results.  
Through DCF, and based on the weighted average of 3 scenarios, the author reached a target price of 13.5£ 
per share, meaning the firm is undervalued (Market Quote = 11.9£), and yielding a buy recommendation. 
With the Multiples approach, the target price attained amounted to 12.1£, lower than with the first method. 
However, in the case of football clubs, a Multiples valuation is hard to perform due to the low number of public 
companies and the structural differences among countries. The average EV/ EBITDA multiple of 12x presents 
an incredibly high standard deviation. Hence, the author sustained the target price of 13.5£ per share. 
The author also compared its valuation results with an Equity Research performed by J. P. Morgan. Using the 
same methodologies, their report also concluded that Manchester United’s shares are undervalued, with a target 
price of 14.5£. However, and unlike the author, their price was achieved by averaging 50%/50% the valuation 
results of the Multiples and the DCF approaches. 
Sumário (Português) 
A presente tese serve o propósito de emitir uma opinião de compra / venda às ações do Manchester United, à 
data de 30 de junho de 2016.  Para o efeito, é possível aplicar diferentes metodologias. O autor optou por 
utilizar DCF e Múltiplos. A primeira metodologia permite construir diversos cenários (correlacionados com a 
performance desportiva) e medir o seu impacto na performance financeira do clube, podendo ser utilizada uma 
vez que o Manchester United pretende manter o seu rácio de alavancagem. A segunda foi realizada numa ótica 
de confirmação de resultados. 
Através do DCF (e utilizando 3 cenários de avaliação) o preço-alvo por ação estimado foi de 13.5£, 
significando que ao autor considera que ações do clube estão subvalorizadas (Preço Mercado = 11.9£), 
recomendando a sua compra. Através da avaliação por Múltiplos o preço obtido foi inferior (12.1£). Não 
obstante, esta metodologia é pouco fiável de aplicar em clubes desportivos. Assim, a recomendação do autor 
mantém-se nos 13.5£ por ação. 
Adicionalmente, o autor realizou uma comparação entre as suas conclusões e um relatório elaborado pela J. P. 
Morgan. Utilizando as mesmas metodologias, o relatório da J. P. Morgan partilha da mesma opinião, mas com 
um preço-alvo superior, i.e., 14.5£. Contudo, e ao contrário do autor da presente tese, o preço-alvo é 
determinado pela média aritmética das duas metodologias. 
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1. Introduction 
An Equity Valuation consists of estimating a target price for a listed company.  
In this case, the author chose Man United (listed on NYSE), as of 30th June 2016. The author suggests 
a Target Price of 13.5£ (vs. Market Quote = 11.9£), meaning Man United shares are undervalued. 
The structure of this thesis is comprised of a Literature Review, where the author presents the most 
widely accepted valuation methodologies; a brief presentation of the soccer industry and the history 
and outlook of the Club; and Valuation Chapters where the author explains why Discounted Cash 
Flows (FCFF) and Multiples are the most suitable approaches to value Man United. 
To assess the fairness of the results obtained, the thesis includes a comparison with an Equity 
Research performed by J. P. Morgan, which also concludes Man United shares to be undervalued, 
suggesting a Target Price of 14.5£. 
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2. Literature Review 
Within the world of finance, there is a long lasting utopic search for the perfect valuation model. 
Nonetheless, those actions have proven innocuous, as different companies comprise distinct 
characteristics, demanding dissimilar approaches. Hence, the focus of both academics and 
professionals should be to develop valuation models that best adapt to each case.  
In the next section the author presents the most widely accepted methodologies, used today in the 
world of finance. 
2.1. The Multiples Valuation 
Also known as Relative Valuation, a Multiples Valuation “is generated by multiplying a value driver 
(such as earnings) by a multiple which is based on the ratio of stock price to that value driver for a 
group of comparable firms”, as Liu et al 2006 describes. As referred by Koller et al (2010) comparable 
firms are those which are expected to yield very similar cash flows in the future as well as equal 
drivers of value, i.e., growth and ROIC.  
A Multiples Valuation is seen by many as a valuable instrument as it is easy to comprehend and 
explain. Its straightforwardness and simple computation allows for a fast assessment of a firm’s value.  
Nonetheless, Multiples offer some important drawbacks that can’t be ignored. In the first place, 
comparable firms aren’t easy to find, as prospects of growth and ROIC vary among them. Second, in 
the process of computing the analysis one should assume that comparable companies are fairly priced 
in the market, which isn’t necessarily true. In the third place, it is common to observe a wide range 
of values within an industry multiple. Consequently, the question arises whether to position the firm 
in the low or the high end of the interval. Finally, despite this technique may provide some guidance 
towards understanding if a certain firm is over or underpriced within its industry, Multiples do not 
help determining if the whole industry is over or underpriced, as shown during the Tech Bubble on 
the late 1990s, as described by Berk et al (2007).  
Due to these limitations, Multiples are generally used either/ both as a complement to a more thorough 
valuation technique, like intrinsic or profitability models, or as a preliminary value analysis. 
Additionally, Multiples are an accurate method to compute the Terminal Value of a DCF model, if 
some analyst judgment is incorporated in the process, as explained by Fernández (2013). 
The first step towards an accurate Multiples Valuation starts with a careful selection of the firm’s 
peer group. On the academic perspective, one should compute the peer group by using all firms in 
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the industry. However, practitioners tend to focus on small peer groups which they perceive to be true 
competitors. As a matter of fact, Cooper et al (2008) found that “using ten closely comparable firms 
is as accurate on average as using the entire cross-section of firms in an industry.” To reduce the peer 
group to a smaller number of firms several tools may be used, either more analytical or more 
theoretical. These techniques will be explained in the next section. 
Past the selection of the peer group one critical question arises: which Multiples to use?  
The answer is hardly consensual. Notwithstanding, empirical evidence stress that forward-looking 
Multiples better explain stock prices, as shown by Liu et al (2002). The underlying explanation, 
according to Koller et al (2010), is that unlike backward-looking multiples, these are consistent with 
the base principle of valuation, i.e., the value of a company is driven by its future cash flows. 
Moreover, in an article by Lui et al (2006) it has been shown that “valuations based on forward 
earnings Multiples are remarkably close to traded prices, and considerably more accurate than 
valuations based on cash flow Multiples.” One of the most widely used earnings multiple is P/E. 
However, as described in Liu et al (2002), enterprise based Multiples yield more accurate results. The 
underlying reason is that P/E does not account for differences in the firms’ capital structures neither 
excludes of the analysis non-operating gains and losses, while enterprise based Multiples do. Thus, 
Enterprise Value to EBITA is considered “the best multiple for comparing valuations across 
companies”, as mentioned by Koller et al (2010). 
Nevertheless, when computing EV/EBITA one should pay special attention to the EBITA figure. As 
Damodaran (2005) stresses, it is rather important to adjust standardized variables when comparing 
asset value. According to Koller et al (2010) the most common adjustments required to compute an 
accurate EBITA figure regard Operating Leases and Pension Expenses. 
On balance, due to some technical limitations, Multiples are generally used to triangulate results and 
test the plausibility of Cash Flow forecasts, rather than as a stand-alone method.  
2.1.1. The Peer Group  
As mentioned before, on the one side academics defend that all firms within an industry are 
competitors. However, practitioners tend to use much smaller peer groups. To drill down and 
understand which firms, within an industry, are truly competitors, different approaches may be taken. 
Some support more theoretical techniques, others believe to be a highly subjective process.  
For Man United the peer group selection will start with an analytical approach, explained in Chapter 
8. After a preliminary list of peers is achieved, a cluster analysis, using the K-means algorithm, will 
be computed to determine whom Man United true peers are. A cluster analysis consists of grouping 
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a set of objects into groups according to the value of certain variables. In the end, similar objects are 
grouped into clusters. The author considers as peer group the Companies comprised in Man United’s 
cluster.  
2.2. Intrinsic Valuation Methods 
Intrinsic Valuation Methods assume that a company/ project’s value is driven by its ability to generate 
value in the future, i.e., determined by its Future Cash Flows, growth potential and risk.  
Free Cash Flow models primarily consist of the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and the Adjusted 
Present Value (APV), with DCF being a practitioners’ favorite. Another well accepted Free Cash 
Flow valuation method is the Dividend Discount Model (DDM). Nonetheless, DDM is usually 
restricted to mature companies, with stable dividend distribution policies. 
All these models use discount rates to compute the present value of Future Cash Flows. Nonetheless, 
while the Enterprise DCF approach uses the WACC (a blended cost of capital between equity holders, 
debt holders and others) the other two valuation models use the cost of equity (the expected return 
that potential equity holders demand to invest in the company/ project). The reasons for the use of 
different Discount Rate will be addressed in the current section while the intricate and decomposition 
will be discussed in section 2.4. 
2.2.1. The Discounted Cash Flows Method (DCF) 
The Discounted Cash Flow method (DCF) consists of forecasting future cash flows and discounted 
them at a rate that reflects their riskiness. This method allows to determine either if a company is 
overvalued/undervalued or if a project can provide certain levels of return demanded by investors. 
Since this work regards and equity valuation this chapter will focus on how to use DCF to determine 
the value of a company, which is expressed through the following formula: 










As one may observe the model considers two different time frames, an explicit one and a Terminal 
Value. Cash Flows should be calculated in an explicit way until they reach high levels of stability. 
According to the best practices this shell occur in 5 to 10 years from the valuation starting point. The 
computation of the Terminal Value will be discussed in section 2.2.1.1.  
Two methods are commonly accepted on how to value the claims of investors: The Enterprise and 
the Equity methods. On the one side, the Enterprise DCF values Operating Cash Flows against all 
investors claims, thereby determining the Equity value indirectly, i.e., by deducting Net Debt and 
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adding Non-Operational Assets and Liabilities to the Enterprise Value. As so, it uses the Free Cash 
Flow to the Firm (FCFF) which is computed by adding NOPLAT, Amortizations and Depreciations 
and subtracting Capital Expenditures and Working Capital variations. On the other side, the Equity 
method values only the equity holders’ claims against operating cash flows, i.e., values Equity 
directly. To do so, it uses the Free Cash Flow to the Equity (FCFE), which consists of cash flow from 
operations, minus capital expenditures, minus payments to debt holders. While the first uses the 
WACC to discount FCFF the second uses the cost of equity to discount FCFE since in the second 
method the claim of debtholders (interests) have already been deducted from cash flow from 
operations.  
The relationship between the two methods is expressed in the following formula: 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸 = 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑡) + 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 As mentioned by Koller et al (2010) “although both methods lead to identical results when applied 
correctly, the equity method is difficult to apply, since matching equity cash flows with the correct 
cost of equity is particularly challenging.” Thus, practitioners recognize the Enterprise DCF as the 
primary model to apply.  
However, WACC-based models are best suited only when a company sets a target D/V and is 
expected to maintain it. In other cases, such as of financial distressed companies undertaking major 
changes, particularly under a Leverage Buyout (LBO) structure, the APV is recommended. This 
method, discussed in section 2.2.2, allows to value cash flows associated with the capital structure 
independently, therefore being more agile than the DCF.  
There is very little literature on how to value football clubs. A paper from Markham (2013) stresses 
that the main drawback on using DCF for football clubs relies on the fact that most football clubs 
present negative results for several years in a row. Nonetheless, it is not the case of Man United, and 
since it is expected to maintain its D/V target, the Enterprise DCF will be the method used to assess 
its value, together with the Multiples approach. 
2.2.1.1. The Terminal Value 
The Terminal Value consists of the value of the company beyond the explicit period, i.e., how much 
the company is worth after all components of Cash Flow are stable. Since this element represents a 
large piece of the pie which is firm’s value, special care should be taken on the assumptions made, 
always guaranteeing they’re realistic and in line with those of the explicit period. If so, this method 
allows estimating continuing value using formulas, rather than doing it explicitly and facing a higher 
probability of producing mistakes. 
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Overtime different methods have been proposed to compute Terminal Value, which can be classified 
in two sections: Cash Flow methods and Non-Cash Flow methods.   
The Cash Flow approach, also known as the perpetuity growth model, assumes that after the explicit 
period the company will continue to operate at a constant pace, i.e., that it will grow at a yearly 
constant growth rate. The most common approach is to use the last year of the explicit period as the 
numerator of the perpetuity, expressed in the following formula: 
 
As so, it is of the outmost importance to guarantee that once the last year of projections is reached the 
company is already at a steady state rhythm. Additionally, it should be taken in consideration that the 
growth rate used should be smaller than the growth rate of the economy, otherwise the company 
would eventually take over all economic activity, which is quite unreasonable.  
The Non-Cash Flow methods consist primarily of the Multiples approach, the Replacement Cost and 
the Liquidation Value.  
The Multiples approach, similarly to Relative Valuation discussed in section 2.1, consists of 
multiplying a value driver (generally from the last year of projections where the Cash Flows are 
expected to be stable) by a certain market Multiple to determine the Terminal Value. The base 
principle is that today’s Multiples consider future prospects of growth. The main drawback of this 
methodology is that prospects of growth in the explicit and non-explicit periods are likely to be 
different, and since Multiples consider both periods is difficult to assess the fairness of the results.   
The Replacement Cost method states that one company’s Terminal Value is equal to the cost of 
replacing its assets. Thus, this method should only be used in situations where all intangible assets 
are replaceable and no intangible assets exist on the balance sheet; otherwise it will understate the 
firm’s value. 
Unlike all other approaches, the Liquidation Value assumes that the company will cease to exist after 
the explicit period (applied to concessions or specific projects), i.e., all assets will be sold and 
liabilities paid. This method is rarely applied in the valuation of companies, unless there is a solid 
reason to consider that the company will be liquidated. 
On balance, the Cash Flow approach is the most commonly used due to its flexibility and accordance 
to the drivers of value. Thus, it will be the method applied to Man United. 
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2.2.2. The Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
As mentioned in section 2.2., the APV method arises as an alternative to DCF, by allowing to value 
companies with volatile debt structures. Additionally, since the model separates economic 
performance from capital structure, it provides managers with a meaningful sense on how capital 
structure is impacting the value of the company, as stated by Luehrman (1996). 
 As a first step of the model, the company is valued as if it had no debt. For this reason, and unlike 
WACC-based models, this method does not take in consideration debt in the Discount Rate, 
discounting the set of Cash Flows (equal in both methods) at the cost of equity.  
Once the unlevered value is determined (VU), the effects of debt in the capital structure are computed.  
First, the present value of interest tax shields is added (VTS). Interest tax shields (ITS) exist in 
countries where the costs of finance (interests) can be incorporated as a cost in P&L, therefore 
reducing the amount of taxes profitable companies pay. If debt is expected to remain constant than 
VTS are computed using the formula below; otherwise there is the need for annual computation.  
PVTSt =
D ∗  rd ∗ T
(1 + rd)t
 
If only these two components were taken in consideration than increasing debt infinitely would create 
infinite value. However, as debt rise so do the risks of the firm falling into bankruptcy. As so, a third 
and final component is incorporated in the model: Bankruptcy costs, which may be direct or indirect.  
The first regard the costs with lawyers and other necessary consultants of such a process or even the 
devaluation of certain assets if they are to be sold in a “fire sale” event. Examples of indirect 
bankruptcy costs are such as the loss of business that occurs because potential customers do not wish 
to take the risk of using a company that may not be able to deliver its goods or services or the decrease 
in productivity of employees that occurs in this type of situations.  
As one can imagine, the process of quantifying indirect costs is quite hard and for this reason DCF is 
still a practitioner’s favorite. Nevertheless, APV comes handy in the case of volatile debt structures, 
being a viable alternative in those cases. 
2.2.3. The Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
The Dividend Discount Model, also referred to as The Gordon Model, is a simple model stating that 
the intrinsic value of a share is the result of the present value of expected dividend payments plus the 
value of the stock when sold, as mentioned by Chaplinsky et al (1998). On a going concern basis the 
investor’s cash flow stream is than restricted to expected dividends. Thus, Gordon Growth Model 
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(GGM) enounces that stock price is driven by the formula shown below, where DPS1 is the expected 
dividend per share on year from now, ke is the cost of equity and g is the dividend’s growth rate in 
perpetuity.  
 
However, and per Damodaran (2012), assuming a constant dividend growth rate, usually based on 
historical data, is quite an unrealistic assumption. As so, other models have been tested overtime, 
where some flexibility is introduced in the payout ratios and growth rates. An example is the three-
stage DDM which assumes an initial stage of high growth, a transactional period where growth 
declines and finally a stage of stable growth. Even though more realistic, it removes most of the 
simplicity and straightforwardness of the GGM, since several extra inputs are required. 
Empirical evidence has proven DDM to be quite useful, particularly in the look for undervalued firms, 
especially those with low P/E ratios and high dividend yield stocks, as explained by Damodaran 
(2012). Notwithstanding, it is quite limited in its use. It is so because even if a company does not pay 
dividends that doesn’t mean it has no intrinsic value. For instance, Apple has been seated in piles of 
cash for many years but it didn’t pay any dividends to its shareholders from 1995 until 2012. Does 
that mean it didn’t had any value over the course of 17 years? The answer is obviously no and shows 
one clear limitation of this model. Thus, DDM should only be used for large and stable companies, 
present in mature markets and with a somewhat predictable rate of dividends’ growth. 
2.3 Valuations Methods based on Profitability 
As mentioned before DCF is a practitioners’ favorite since relies exclusively on the cash flows of a 
company/ project. However, DCF is often criticized as single years’ cash flows provide little insight 
regarding the performance of the company. Thus, Economic-profit-based models are often used as a 
complementary valuation method highlighting how and when a company creates value, as explained 
by Koller et al (2010). The most widely used is the Economic Value Added (EVA). 
2.3.1. The Economic Value Added Model (EVA) 
EVA determines a company/ project’s ability to generate value each year through the difference 
between the return of firm’s assets and the cost to make that investment available, i.e., it states that a 
company is only able to generate economic value if the return on invested capital (ROIC) exceeds its 
cost of capital. 
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The Market Value Added model consists on the sum of each year’s EVA, allowing to determine 
firm’s value. As expressed in the following formula, the firm’s value of a company is equal to the 























2.4. The Discount Rate 
As mentioned earlier both intrinsic and profitability-based models discount Cash Flows or Economic 
Profit at a certain discount rate. Depending on the model chosen the rate used may either be the 
WACC or the cost of equity. How to compute each of them will be discussed in the next sections. 
2.4.1. The WACC  
The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is a formula that blends both the opportunity costs 
of debtholders, equityholders, and others, when applicable.  
Since DCF uses FCFF, the WACC and the DCF are tied together for decades. 
WACC =   
D
D + E + P
∗ rd ∗ (1 − t) + (
P
D + E + P
∗ rp) +
E
D + E + P
∗ re 
However, over the past years both the DCF and the WACC have been considered obsolete. The major 
critiques are that not all companies target their debt level (one of the assumptions of WACC) and that 
as more and more new and exotic instrument appear in the markets the less agile WACC is to value 
their impact in the firms’ value. Nevertheless, they are still the most commonly used by practitioners’ 
due to its straightforwardness. Additionally, the company under valuation on this report has no exotic 
debt instruments, which strengths the argument that WACC is the discount rate for valuation 
purposes. 
2.4.2. The Cost of Equity 
 “The cost of equity is determined by three factors: the risk-free rate of return, the market-wide risk 
premium (the expected return of the market portfolio less the return of risk-free bonds), and a risk 
adjustment that reflects each company’s riskiness relative to the average company.”, as explained by 
Koller et al (2010). 
 The most widely used model is the CAPM (asset pricing model) which states that investors should 
be compensated both for the time value of money and for the riskiness of the company. The first is 
represented by the risk-free, while the second derives from the multiplication of a risk-premium equal 
for all companies and adjusted through the correlation of the company with the market. 
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𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝑃 + 𝐶𝑅𝑃 
The Country Risk Premium was added to the formula, for the reasons explained ahead in section 
2.4.2.4.. 
Additionally, even though new models have been proposed, such as the Fama-French three-factor or 
the Carhart four-factor models, which use more than one explanatory variable to determine the returns 
of the market, CAPM is still the biggest industry reference and the one used to compute Man United’s 
Cost of Equity. 
2.4.2.1. The Risk-free Rate 
When figuring the risk-free rate of a project or company the most accurate approach would be to 
compute a portfolio that had no covariance with the market, i.e., a zero-beta CAPM. However, due 
to the implied complexity of the process, most practitioners resort to government bonds, which they 
perceive as a sufficiently good proxy. However, to do so, certain precautions must be held. 
According to Fernández (2015), the use of historical average of government bonds to determine the 
risk-free rate is a very common mistake that should be avoided, as the yielded results do not reflect 
the riskiness of future issues, particularly, in periods where interest rates are exceptionally low or 
high. Instead, one should use forward-looking risk-free rates that match the maturity of each Cash 
Flow. This last suggestion, however, would go against the great advantage of the WACC, its 
straightforwardness.  
The industry practice is to select one risk-free rate and use it to discount all Cash Flow, irrespective 
to Cash Flow maturity. Thus, it is of the outmost importance to derive the risk-free rate using as 
underlying one or more government bonds that better match the maturity of the entire set of Future 
Cash Flows. Therefore, short-term government bonds should never be used as they “fail to recognize 
that a bondholder can probably reinvest at higher rate when the short-term bond matures”, as stressed 
by Koller et al (2010). Most practitioners resort to 10 year German bonds, if valuing a European 
company, or 10 year US government bonds, in the case of U.S. companies. 
Additionally, to guarantee that inflation is modeled consistently, the currency of the risk-free rate and 
of the Cash Flows must be the same. Hence, in the case of Manchester United, the author will resort 
to a liquid 10 year UK government bond. 
2.4.2.2. The Market Risk Premium 
The Market Risk Premium, also known as the Equity Risk Premium, represents the difference 
between the expected return of a market portfolio and a risk-free benchmark (typically the one used 
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for the computation of the risk-free rate). However, investigators find difficult to explain what causes 
this difference and so diverse approaches may be taken. For instances, Koller et al (2010) suggests 3 
different models, being one of them a practitioners’ favorite and the most widely used in the industry, 
which is the Historical Market Risk Premium, consisting, as the name suggests, of the historical 
average of the difference.  
At this point, the discussion arises on which average to use. Damodaran (2005) points out that 
arithmetic average yields the best unbiased premium, however others suggest the geometric average 
should be used since the former may overstate the premium.  
Additionally, is of the outmost importance that the market chosen to compute MRP truthfully reflects 
the operations of the company. Also, Koller et al (2010) suggests to compare the market returns over 
a long-term government bond and to use the longest period possible (excluding periods of crisis, 
which can adulterate the results). One should always keep in mind that WACC refers to the discount 
of Future Cash Flows and for this reason all components should consider future risk, instead of past 
risk. Since in the case of MRP that is very hard to compute, the method chosen must yield the best 
proxy possible. 
Despite the drawbacks, Koller et al (2010) stresses that the different models yield similar results, i.e., 
market risk premiums between 4.5% and 5.5%. For 2016, which is the year of the present valuation, 
Damodaran suggest an MRP of 6.25%. On chapter 5, the author explains how Man United’s MRP is 
calculated, and will take in consideration these values for comparison purposes. 
2.4.2.3. The Beta 
The Beta, within the CAPM model, represents the correlation between the market movements and 
the stock price fluctuations of the company. Nonetheless, estimating Beta is a complex process.  
Damodaran (2005) suggests to use empirical estimation, by regressing the returns of the stock on the 
returns of the market portfolio, expressed by the following formula: 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙 ∗ 𝑅𝑚 
In this case, a market index will serve as proxy for the market portfolio. As so, one should pay 
attention to which market index to use and the period and length of data. A large period of data allows 
for more observations; however, it should be just if it still represents the firm’s current characteristics. 
Monthly data yields better results than daily data, as it eliminates autocorrelation among observations. 
Koller et al (2010) suggests to use 5 years of monthly data of a liquid market index, also being the 
industry practice.  
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However, most practitioners, advise to improve Beta estimation by using industry comparable 
companies instead of an index, which they perceive to be more representative of the firm’s market 
risk. To do so, one must start with the selection of a peer group. After the peer group is properly 
established (being the same as in the Multiples valuation), one should compute the average of the 
Unlevered Beta (which does not consider the finance structure of the companies) of the comparable 
companies, and then leveraging it using the industry average of the Debt/Equity Ratio and the 
Statutory Tax Rate, both representing the industry optimal capital structure and tax structure, 
respectively. The formula to compute the levered beta of the industry, considered in the CAPM 
computation, is as follows: 
𝛽𝑙 = 𝛽𝑢 ∗ (1 +
𝐷
𝐸
∗ (1 − 𝑡𝑐)) 
The author will compute Beta using industry comparable companies while resorting to Index 
correlation as a sanity check.  
2.4.2.4. The Country Risk Premium 
Even though the valuation of businesses in emerging markets follows the same principles as in any 
other context, it brings to the table supplementary concerns that must be addressed. According to 
Koller et al (2010), these issues primarily regard macroeconomic uncertainty, illiquid capital markets, 
barriers to the capital flow, less rigorous standards of accounting and high levels of political risk. 
Notwithstanding, little agreement exists on how to model them.  
The two most common techniques used by practitioners are DCFs using probability-weighted 
scenarios or to include a country risk premium into the cost of capital. The first technique yields more 
robust results and a better understanding if value is being created. However, Damodaran (2013) 
considers that even with the first technique being used, the CRP on emerging markets should only be 
disregarded if the country risk premium is idiosyncratic and if one assumes that investors invest in 
global portfolios. Being hardly plausible to assume that all countries have low levels of correlation 
and that no home bias is present in portfolios, Damodaran (2013) believes equity risk premiums do 
vary across countries.  
Since most of Man United’s activity is held in the UK, there is no need to compensate emerging 
markets risk and so CRP will not be considered in the estimation of the Cost of Equity. 
2.4.3. The Cost of Debt 
The estimation of the pre-tax cost of debt of a certain company is dependent on the availability of 
information. If obtainable, the best proxy is the YTM of the company’s debt, i.e., the promised rate 
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of return assuming all coupons we’ll be paid on time and the principal repaid in full. The YTM may 
be obtained using the last issued bond or, in case of multiple bonds available, through the weighted-
average of the YTM of each bond and the amount issued. Ideally, the YTM should be computed using 
liquid, option-free, long-term debt, as explained by Koller et al (2010). 
In the case of a company with no long-term publicly traded debt or, even if issued, highly illiquid, 
one should use an indirect method. After determining the company’s credit rating, the YTM should 
be computed by averaging the yield of a portfolio of long-term bonds with an equal credit rating.  
To obtain the after-tax cost of debt, used in the WACC, simply multiply the pre-tax cost of debt by 1 
minus the marginal tax rate of the company. 
2.5. The Option Theory 
To correctly assess the value of a company/ project offering a high degree of future managerial 
flexibility, Koller et al (2010) recommends not to use traditional valuation methods, even in the case 
where multiple cash flow scenarios are used in a DCF approach. Fernández (2015) states that a “real 
option exists in an investment when there are future possibilities for action and when the solution of 
a current uncertainty is known”. Obvious examples are the decisions of expanding or deferring 
investments in commodities such as oil and mining concessions, whether to expand to other 
geographies or consolidate current ones, bet on research and development of new products or 
increasing production of profitable ones, and so on.  
Over the years two main approaches to option theory have been established: Real-Option Valuation 
(ROV) and Decision Tree Analysis (DTA). Despite ROV being theoretically superior to DTA, it is 
not the most appropriate method for all situations. ROV is best suited when Cash Flows are highly 
correlated to traded commodities, securities or currencies; i.e., when there is available information on 
non-diversifiable traded assets. It is so because it’s the only method providing a clear approach on 
how to discount the project’s contingent Cash Flows. Per Koller et al (2010), in situations where risk 
is diversifiable DTA is an appropriate and easier to use tool, allowing to discount the Cash Flows at 
the risk-free rate.      
2.5.1. Real-Option Valuation (ROV) 
The most common model to evaluate options of a single stock or commodity is the Black-Scholes 
model. A stock/ commodity option consists on the right to sell or buy a certain underlying asset at 
some point in the future. When determining the value of a stock option, this model incorporates the 
option's strike price and the time to the option's expiry as well as the constant price variation of the 
stock and the time value of money. It assumes however that the price of heavily traded assets follow 
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a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift and volatility. As so, it is a quite accurate method 
but only applicable to highly liquid stocks with no “jump in asset prices”, as stressed by Damodaran 
(2005). Additionally, as mentioned by Fernández (2015) other precautions must be held to use ROV. 
For instance, if real options are not replicable, i.e., if no equal portfolio exists in the market, “using 
financial option formulas, like the Black and Scholes formula, is completely inappropriate”.  
2.5.2. Decision Tree Analysis (DTA) 
As mentioned before ROV is only applicable to a small range of cases. As so, DTA rose as an 
alternative approach. 
The most widely used Decision Tree Analysis is the Binomial Option Pricing Model. This model 
assumes that at the end of each period there is only 2 possible outcomes. By weighting each outcome 
with a certain probability of success it is than possible to discount them at a risk-free rate (since the 
outcomes are known they face no risk) and value the option at stake. Despite of being a simplistic 
model it is quite accurate, particularly because it uses the same assumption of the Black-Scholes 
formula – “that option payoffs can be replicated exactly by constructing a portfolio out of a risk-free 
bond and the underlying stock”, as stated by Berk et al (2007).  
2.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity analysis, within the scope of Corporate Finance and Financial Modeling, consists on 
attributing different values to key variables, to create valuation intervals. In the case of football clubs, 
this analysis is even more crucial, as its financial performance, in some areas, is in depth correlated 
with the sports performance of the club, over the past years. In section 6 of this thesis, the author will 
present which are the key variables considered to create 3 different scenarios of firm’s value, 
dependent on expected sports performance. 
2.7. Value at Risk (VaR) 
The Value at Risk (VaR) is a tool that allows to understand the maximum level of risk that an asset 
is exposed to, given a certain confidence level. This tool is mainly used in financial institutions to 
measure the risk of portfolios and to adjust investment policies. Nonetheless, more and more 
practitioners resort to VaR to assess risk for non-financial companies. 
There are several models to compute VaR, with each company adjusting it to its specific conditions. 
According to Manganelli (2001), one may compute VaR using a Monte Carlo Simulation, which is 
the technique that will be used in the case of Man United. 
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2.8. LR Conclusion 
As mentioned throughout the literature review, several approaches and methods may be applied to 
valuate a company. Depending of firms’ characteristics and capital structure, some methods are more 
suited than others. 
Since Man United has no defined policies on dividends distribution and is expected to maintain its 
target Debt/Equity Ratio, methods such as DDM or the APV are not suited. Also, it would be very 
hard to compute a replicating portfolio for Man United’s activity, and for this reason the author 
decided not to apply the ROV model. 
As so, DCF will be used to valuate Man United, allowing to consider different scenarios (through 
sensitivity analysis of crucial variables). Sport clubs’ value is in-depth dependent on expectations for 
future sports performance. As so, 3 different scenarios will be considered. Afterwards, a weighted 
average of the 3 scenarios will be computed, based on the expected probability of each. The explicit 
period will endure for 4 years (enough to compute sports performance for each scenario), while the 
terminal value will be the average of the explicit period cash-flows or a growth percentage applied to 
the last year of the explicit period, in each scenario.  
Additionally, a Multiples valuation, based on Enterprise value, will be computed to cross-check DCF 
results. 
In the end, the author will compare its own results with an Equity Valuation performed by J. P. 
Morgan (also valuates Man United using DCF and Multiples), and compute the VaR for the company, 
to better understand the risk of the price target achieved. 
3. Industry Analysis 
Football was first developed and codified in the XIX century, in England. However, was only turned 
into and industry in the beginning of the 20th century, with the inception of FIFA (Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association), in 1904. 
Since then the industry has been subject of exponential growth, particularly over the past decade, 
mainly related with the expansion to Asian and North American markets, which only recently started 
to pay attention to the sport. 
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Figure 1 – Accumulated Revenue of the Top 20 Clubs in the World, Source: Deloitte 
Like in every other billion-dollar industry, the political environment has grown stronger as structures 
turn more complex and oversee became necessary. Nowadays, professional football may be split in 
3 categories: 
i) National Teams Competitions: managed by FIFA, which is responsible for the 
organization of the most important international tournaments. Even though FIFA does not 
determine the rules of the game, it is the most important government body, as it holds 50% 
of the voting powers at IFAB (International Football Association Board), whom is 
responsible to decide the Amendments to the Laws of football. However, since 
Manchester United is a club and not a Nation, the industry analysis will be focused on the 
next two categories. 
 
ii) International Clubs’ Competitions: FIFA has created 6 confederations / associations to 
supervise and control football competitions between the elite clubs of each region in the 
globe. Manchester United is incorporated in the UEFA jurisdiction, and for that reason it 
has the possibility to participate in the most important football competition: UEFA 
Champions League. 
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Nowadays, the UEFA elite competition represents a market worth more than 2 billion 
Euros. For the clubs, and from 2015 onwards, it represents over 1.2 billion Euros in prizes, 
split between 724 million Euros in performance prizes and 483 million Euros in the 
broadcasting market pool. The winner of this competition is awarded with a 100 million 
Euros total prize. For this reason, the different valuation scenarios of Man United 
considered in this report present different possible outcomes in the Champions League.  
iii) National Clubs’ Competitions: each country has its own national competitions, generally 
split by categories, due to the immensity of clubs nationwide. Manchester United 
participates in the Premier League of UK Football, the most valuable national competition 
in the world, which is also worth several billion Euros per year. In this competition, clubs 
earn their share based on 3 components: i) Merit money, based in the position clubs 
finished in the previous season ii) Equal TV Rights, £55 million are distributed equally to 
each club; and iii) Facility fee, distributed according to the number of games each club 
has broadcasted on TV.  
However, top clubs’ earnings are generated by more than just broadcasting rights, prizes and 
Matchday revenues (particularly in the Premiere League where stadiums are always full).  
Top clubs are nowadays empowered brands, living out of their commercial rights such as 
sponsorships and merchandise. According to KPMG, the overall commercial revenue of all clubs 
present on the Top 5 national leagues (UK, Germany, France, Spain and Italy), in 2015, accounted 
for over 5.3 billion Euros, meaning this caption has grown 45% since 2010. 
Additionally, clubs have also been increasingly active in social networks, helping them to create 
awareness to the sport worldwide. According to Deloitte, the Top 20 clubs in the world have now 
more than 500 million likes on Facebook and over 150 million twitter and Instagram followers 
combined. 
On balance, the football industry has been growing and is expected to keep on this track, mainly 
because of its export to new and very passionate markets (Asia and North America) and due to its 
ability to stay interesting and innovative. As for Man United, presented in detail in the next section, 
is fortunate to participate in the two most important and lucrative club competitions: UEFA 
Champions League and the Premier League. 
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4. Company Presentation 
Manchester United is a professional football club based in Old Trafford, Great Manchester (UK). The 
club’s inception took place in 1878, first named as Newton Heath LYR and then changed to 
Manchester United, in 1902.  
The track record of the club is impressive. The club has won 20 Premier League titles (record), 12 
FA Cups, 4 League Cups and 21 FA Community Shields, together holding more titles than any other 
club in top-performance English football.  
Internationally, has attained 3 Champions League titles, 1 UEFA Cup and other relevant titles. Hence, 
it is no wonder, especially with the internationalization of football to Asia and North America, that 
Manchester United is one of the most followed and beloved football clubs on earth. 
Other clubs hold several activities besides sports, such as insurance, events and others. It is not the 
case of Manchester United. Its activity is exclusively focused on football, with turnover arising from 
Broadcasting Rights, Merchandise & Sponsorships and Matchday revenue.  
Manchester United was re-listed in the NYSE on August 2012, as part of a strategy to lower the club’s 
leverage level.   
4.1. Historical Financial Performance 
Per the Management of Man United, the strategy addressed for the development of the club in the 
past couple of years has been focusing on brand awareness, to leverage the global phenomenon of 
football. 
To do so, and due to the drawback of below average sports performance, the strategy has been 
achieved through the acquisition of expensive players, i.e., high Capex. The strategy has yielded good 
results, shown by the growth in Commercial revenues, particularly with the highly profitable 
agreement signed with Adidas on August 2015. The increase in revenue and Adjusted EBITDA 
margin (which only considers recurrent and operational costs, i.e., employee expenses, external 
suppliers’ services and operating lease costs) has also allowed to reduce debt levels and allow for 
higher financial flexibility. 
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Figure 3 – Man United historical financial performance, Source: Author’s analysis 
 
4.2. What the future holds for Manchester United 
As mentioned before, the football industry has grown exponentially over the past decades, particularly 
after high-quality television expanded worldwide. The top clubs at that time are the ones that have 
being benefited the most of this phenomenon, as people got attached to them at the time of choosing 
their “favorite international club”. 
Every year, Deloitte issues one edition of Football Money League, the most respected report about 
the economics of football. On the report one may find how the top 20 clubs of last season have 
performed financially and what to expect next season. 
The Football Money League key outlook for 2016/2017 is that “Real Madrid complete an eleventh 
year at the top of the Money League but we expect this to be the last in that sequence as Manchester 
United look set to be top of the table next year”. This conclusion is based on “the return of Manchester 
United to Champions League football in 2015/16, despite having suffered a disappointing exit from 
the group stage, plus the commencement of the Adidas partnership, that should help United to top 
next year’s Money League.” 
Moreover, one should never forget that football is all about passion. For this reason, and despite the 
underperformance of the club in the past 3 years, the investment in well-known and quite popular 
players has increased and is expected to continue, at approximately £130M per year, way above the 
market average. The Management of Man United perceives this strategy as the best to keep worldwide 
interest in Man United. 
However, the activity of Manchester United also holds some risks that must be addressed. On the one 
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league in the next seasons, sustained underperformance in the Premier League or injury of key 
players. On the other side, the loss of key commercial agreements or the failure to sign new ones. 
Apparently, and as one may observe in the valuation sections of this report, the market investors 
perceive those risks to be higher than both the author and J. P. Morgan, since both target prices surpass 
Man United’s current market value.  
 
Figure 4 – Man United stock price evolution vs. Target Prices, Source: Author’s analysis 
5. Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
In this section the author presents the methodology used to compute the WACC, which will later be 
used to discount Future Cash Flows in the DCF model. 
As mentioned before, the WACC blends the cost of capital and the cost of debt (and others, when 
applicable). The variables that compose WACC will be explained in the next sections. However, 
another important issue is how to determine which blend of debt and equity to use in the WACC.  
The weight of each component should represent the market optimal capital structure and not the firms’ 
specific conditions. When valuing a company, one investor should be penalized or compensated for 
past Management decisions regarding capital structure. Man United’s D/E target ratio was computed 
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Table 1 – Composition of the WACC 
5. 1 The Cost of Equity (Ke) 
To compute the Cost of Equity the author resorted to CAPM, with each component explained in detail 
in the following sections. 
5.1.1. The Risk-free rate 
In order to thoroughly determine the risk-free rate, the most accurate approach would be to compute 
a portfolio that had no covariance with the market, i.e., a zero-beta CAPM. However, due to the 
implied complexity of the process, most practitioners resort to government bonds.  
If possible, one should match the maturity of each Cash Flow with the maturity of the risk-free rate 
used. Nonetheless, the most common method is to derive the risk-free rate from one or several 
government bonds that better match the maturity of the entire set of Cash Flows estimated for the 
company.  
Thus, for Man United, the author will use the implied YTM of 10-year liber-denominated UK Index 
(GUKG10 Index). As of 30th June 2016, yields to 0.87%. 
5.1.2. Market Risk Premium (MRP) 
As mentioned earlier in the literature review, despite the inexistence of consensus regarding a single 
method to determine the market risk premium, several approaches have been presented overtime, 
converging to similar results. The most widely used method consists in averaging the annualized 
excess returns of the market over a long-term risk-free rate, generally 10-year government bonds.  
Since the excess returns of the market will later be used in computing Beta, the frequency and length 
of data will be the same. For this reason, monthly data from August 2012 until June 2016 will be 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
Cost of Equity (Ke)
Risk Free Rate (Rf) 0,87%
Market Risk Premium (MRP) 4,15%
Re-levered Beta 0,85
Unlevered Beta 0,71
Cost of Equity (Ke) 4,4%
Cost of Debt (Kd)
Cost of Debt (Before Tax) 5,3%
Tax Rate 20,0%
Cost of Debt (Kd) 4,3%
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used. Most practitioners use 5 years of monthly data, however Man United only issued its IPO on 
August 2012.  
Also, one should select a well-diversified and liquid index to serve as a market proxy for the company. 
The Morgan Stanley Capital International Europe (MSCI Europe) is composed of large and mid-cap 
companies of 15 European countries. As for the risk-free rate, it will be the same used to compute the 
cost of equity.  
This method yielded a MRP of 4.15%, which the author perceives to be quite reasonable when 
comparing to the interval mentioned in the literature review.  
5.1.3. The Beta 
As mentioned in the literature review, one should start to compute the Beta by regressing the stock 
returns against a well-weighted and liquid market index. In the case of Man United the author chose 
the MSCI Europe, for the reasons stated before. By regressing the historical returns of Man United, 
between August 2012 and June 2016, with the excess returns of the market, i.e., it yielded a Beta of 
0.58. 
Nonetheless, and as explained in the literature review, a more accurate method is used by most 
practitioners, consisting of leveraging to the firm’s capital structure, the unlevered beta of the peer 
group (also using monthly data from August 2012 until June 2016), by using formula stated in the 
Literature Review. 
As for Man United, this method yielded a levered beta of 0.85, higher than the previous method, 
which is explained by the fact that football clubs tend to have more debt in their optimal capital 
structure, when compared to other industry that compose the MSCI Europe Index. Hence, we 
conclude that 0.85 is the Beta that truly translates the correlation between Man United and the Market. 
Also, is interesting to notice that D/E vary immensely among clubs, with English clubs being less 
leveraged when compared to its peers. Man United’s D/E ratio is around half of the industry average 
(12.5% vs. 25%), being part of the club’s financial strategy to provide more financial flexibility. 
 
Table 2 – Industry Beta (Comparables) 
Multiples Valuation
Name Country Market Cap. (M'£)
Market Beta 
(08/2012-06/2016)
Tx Rate Debt/Equity LF
Unlevered 
Beta
Juventus IT 307 0,55 31% 43,5% 0,85
Arsenal GB 1.145 0,42 20% 0,0% 0,42
Borussia Dortmund GE 455 0,13 30% 7,0% 0,18
Galatasaray TU 285 0,70 20% 52,3% 1,12
Fenerbahce TU 316 0,76 20% 25,0% 0,96
Average Multiple 25,6% 0,71
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5.2. The Cost of Debt (Kd) 
As mentioned earlier, the best proxy for the cost of debt is the YTM of the company’s debt, i.e., the 
promised rate of return assuming all coupons we’ll be paid on time and the principal repaid in full, 
ideally, of liquid, option-free, long-term bond.  
Man United issued on 26/06/2015 (4 days prior to the date of this valuation report) a 9-year maturity 
bond, which as of 30th of June 2016 holds a YTM of 5.34%, which will be used as the pre-tax cost of 
debt. 
6. Valuation Overview 
As stated in the Literature Review, Man United will be valued under two different methodologies: 
DCF and Multiples. Section 6 of this report presents the main assumptions and inputs used to compute 
the first method.  
6.1. Scenarios 
The economic performance of a sports club is intrinsically correlated with the results on the field. In 
the case of Man United, particularly in the short term, the impact of sports performance in the 
profitability of the club is not immense, since its financial capability is assured by its historical 
reputation and brand awareness, guaranteed by contracts with sponsors and merchandisers. 
Nonetheless, if in the long-run Manchester United is not capable to go back to the big stages of 
European football, its money-making capability stays at risk.To transpose this knowledge into 
numbers, the author prepared 3 scenarios, which serve as a proxy to different possible performances 
of Man United, both in the Premier League and in the Champions League, in the upcoming seasons. 
 
Table 3 –Scenarios for sports performance (per season) 
Where, R16 means the round of 16 and SF the Semi-finals.  
Based on historical figures, UEFA prize and Tv pools distribution policies updated for the coming 
years and the new policy on the Premier League TV Pool distribution prizes, the impact of such 
scenarios is as follows:  
Scenarios
2016-2017 2017-2018 2018-2019 2019-2020
PL CL PL CL PL CL PL CL
A 3rd R16 1st R16 3rd SF 3rd R16
B 3rd R16 1st R16 3rd Wiinner 1st R16
C 3rd R16 3rd R16 3rd R16 3rd R16
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Table 4 –Scenarios for sports performance (per season), in numbers 
The scenarios will contribute with different weights to the final valuation, as explained ahead in 
section 7.  
 6.2. Turnover 
Turnover projections are perhaps the most important estimation in an Equity Valuation, as many 
variable components of the Valuation evolve in accordance with the turnover. Hence, a more 
thorough analysis has to be made to this caption. 
Man United turnover comprises Commercial, Broadcasting and Matchday activities. 








Figure 5 – Man United’s turnover’s historical growth per business segment 
Scenarios
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
A Broadcasting - UEFA Competitions 20,0 20,0 30,0 20,0 22,5
A Broadcasting - FAPL 120,0 140,0 120,0 120,0 125,0
A UEFA prizes 23,5 36,5 23,5 23,5 26,8
A Season Tickets, Matchday Tickets & Others 100,0 120,0 100,0 100,0 105,0
B Broadcasting - UEFA Competitions 20,0 20,0 50,0 20,0 27,5
B Broadcasting - FAPL 120,0 140,0 120,0 140,0 130,0
B UEFA prizes 23,5 51,5 23,5 23,5 30,5
B Season Tickets, Matchday Tickets & Others 100,0 130,0 100,0 100,0 107,5
C Broadcasting - UEFA Competitions 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0
C Broadcasting - FAPL 120,0 120,0 120,0 120,0 120,0
C UEFA prizes 23,5 23,5 23,5 23,5 23,5
C Season Tickets, Matchday Tickets & Others 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
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Table 5 – Man United’s turnover historical growth (detailed) 
6.2.1. Commercial 
“Commercial revenue comprises revenue receivable from the exploitation of the Manchester United 
brand through sponsorship and other commercial agreements, including minimum guaranteed 
revenue, and fees for the Manchester United first team undertaking tours.” The Commercial area is 
divided in 3 major segments: Sponsorship, Retail & Merchandise and Mobile & Content. 
Sponsorship 
The number and value of regional and global sponsorships has been increasing, having signed 14 new 
sponsorship deals in 2015/2016.The most important sponsorship deal, with General Motors, was 
renewed in the 2014/2015 season, with more advantageous conditions. As so, Man United expects 
this turnover line to grow at a steady pace, now that that have renewed their most important 
sponsorship. 
Retail & Merchandise 
The Retail and Merchandise activity has suffered a major twist in July 2015, as Man United swapped 
Nike for Adidas (as the Nike contract expired), having guaranteed in this new contract a minimum 
amount of revenues of £75M/year, which is already reflected in the last fiscal year (FY15/16), and 
explains most of the turnover increase in the Commercial caption. 
Turnover Historical Forecast
(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Commercial 189 197 268
% grow th n/a 4,1% 36,2%
Sponsorships 155 160
% grow th n/a 3,4%
Retail & Merchandise 32 97
% grow th n/a 207,9%
Mobile & Content 10 11
% grow th n/a 4,8%
Broadcasting 136 108 140
% grow th n/a (20,7%) 30,4%
Broadcasting - FAPL 108 100
% grow th n/a (7,1%)
Broadcasting - UEFA Competitions - 40
% grow th n/a n/a
Matchday 108 91 107
% grow th n/a (16,2%) 17,7%
UEFA prizes - 17
% grow th n/a n/a
Season Tickets, Matchday Tickets & Others 91 90
% grow th n/a (0,6%)
Turnover 433 395 515
% grow th n/a (8,7%) 30,4%
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Additionally, in this last season, Man United has brought the management of the most important store 
in-house and signed new deals with Sbenu, New Era and Columbia.  
This summer Man United has signed several star players such as Pogba, Ibrahimovic and Mkhitaryan. 
Hence, the Management expects retail and merchandise turnover to have a strong grow in the next 
couple of years. 
Mobile & Content 
Year-on-year the revenue regarding Mobile and growth has been very steady, with the management 
finding hard to growth this segment. Additionally, this revenue is based on signed partnerships, with 
secured expectation on its renewal, so it is not expected to decrease any time soon. 
6.2.2. Broadcasting 
“Broadcasting revenue represents revenue receivable from all UK and overseas broadcasting 
contracts, including contracts negotiated centrally by the FA Premier League and UEFA.” 
For the period of 2017-2019, FA has announced that Domestic Premier League rights were 
renegotiated, and will suffer an increase of 70%. For the period of 2016-2018, UEFA has announced 
that Champions League broadcasting rights were renegotiated and increased in 25%.  
Both factors mean the broadcasting revenue of Man United will increase severally, depending on 
their Premier League and Champions League performance (contemplated in the Scenarios). However, 
the increase will be gradual over the years. 
6.2.3. Matchday 
“Matchday revenue includes revenue receivable from all domestic and European match day activities 
from Manchester United games at Old Trafford and fees for arranging other events at the Old Trafford 
stadium.” 
Match day turnover has been kept steady over the years. Man United has an extended waiting list for 
new members to join the club, meaning all seasons tickets and home games are always sold out. For 
the grow of this turnover caption the only variable component are European matches, which will be 
estimated according to each scenario. 
6.3. Operational Expenses 
The Operational Expenses of Manchester United regard to Employee Expenses, External Services 
and Supplies, Fixed Costs and Depreciation / Amortizations (explained ahead in Capital 
Expenditures). 
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6.3.1. Employees Expenses 
As for the last couple of years, Man United employees’ expenses range from 45% to 51% of the 
club’s turnover. According to Vice Chairman Ed Woodward “The strong financial performance has 
enabled us to invest in our squad, team management and facilities to position us to challenge for, and 
win, trophies in the coming years”. This statement translated, among other things, in the acquisition 
of expensive players in previous seasons. Naturally, expensive players have higher wages, and since 
this policy is expected to continue, the wages in percentage of turnover are expected to be somewhere 
in that interval.  
Since this caption has such strong impact on the valuation of the company, and together with the 
investment in players’ registrations (explained ahead), will be subject of Sensitivity Analysis 
scenarios.  
6.3.2. External Services and Supplies 
ESS refer primarily to match day and training costs. Historically, this caption ranges from 17% to 
19% of the club’s turnover. Man United Management does not expect savings in the next couple of 
years, so the author assume ESS will keep stable and evolve at historical pace with turnover. 
6.3.3. Fixed Costs 
Fixed Costs include Auditor’s Remunerations, Operating Lease Costs and Non-Recurring Items, and 
have little weight in the overall cost structure of the club.  
Non-Recurring items were not considered in the Adjusted EBITDA. 
6.4. Capital Expenditures (Capex) 
 
Table 6 – Man United’s historical Capex 
Capex Historical Forecast
(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Players' registrations 205 239 244
Amortization (55) (100) (108)
% amort rate 74,4% 95,4%
CapEx n/a (134) (113)
% turnover 33,9% 21,9%
PPE 255 251 246
Depreciation (9) (10) (10)
CapEx n/a (6) (5)
% turnover 2,6% 2,0%
Fixed Assets 459 490 490
Total CapEx (140,1) (118,4)
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6.4.1. Property, Plant and Equipment 
As for Man United, PPE mainly comprises the Old Trafford Stadium and the Aon Training Complex. 
According to the Management, there is no expectation of major renewals of both infrastructures in 
the near future. For this reason, it is reasonable to assume that the long-term investment will not be 
higher than the depreciation rate used. 
PPE is depreciated at an average rate of 4%, mainly because both the stadium and the training ground 
possess low deprecation rates. 
6.4.2. Players’ registrations 
As mentioned before, and quoted by Vice Chairman Ed Woodward, Man United is investing heavily 
and will continue to do it, in order to become once again a Top line team in the Champions League. 
For this reason, the author considered that the current high levels of Capex - around 22% of turnover 
- will hold in the coming years.   
Players’ are registered at acquisition cost, which is amortized according to the length of the contract. 
6.5. Net Working Capital  
 
Table 7 – Man United’s historical Net Working Capital 
6.5.1. Working Capital - Assets 
Man United Working Capital Needs are comprised of Trade and Other Receivables and Inventories.  
All trade receivables ageing over 1 year were reclassified to Non-Operational Assets as they can’t be 
considered as Operational. Historically, the Days of Sales Outstanding (DSO) at Man United are quite 
stable within the 60 and 70 days’ interval.   
Net Working Capital Historical Forecast
(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Trade and Other Receivables (Operational) 104 81 119
DSO Current Op. 73 62 70
Inventories - - 1
% turnover 0,0% 0,0% 0,2%
Current Tax Receivable - 0 -
% turnover 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Working Capital (Assets) 104 81 120
Trade and Other Payables (Operational) (63) (85) (125)
DPO Current Op. 65 94 116
Current Tax Liabilities (3) (2) (7)
% variable costs of Operating Expenses 1,0% 0,8% 2,1%
Deferred Revenue (181) (187) (189)
% commcercial turnover 95,5% 94,8% 70,4%
Working Capital (Liabilities) (247) (273) (320)
Net Working Capital (143) (193) (201)
Investment/(Divestment) in Working Capital n/a 49,8 8,3
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Since August 2015, Man United brought the management of the most important merchandise store 
in-house. For that reason, they have started to manage inventory, which the Management perceives 
to be accounted at fair value, since all purchase are quite recent. 
6.5.2. Working Capital - Liabilities 
Man United Working Capital Sources mainly regard Trade and Other Payables, Current Tax 
Liabilities and Deferred Revenue. 
Man United has increased its average operational DPO, mainly because it has been acquiring more 
expensive players and granted with larger paying periods, which are expected to stabilize, already 
reflecting this policy, which is expected to continue. 
Current Tax Liabilities are primarily generated by staff wages contributions and advanced payment 
of corporate taxes, having very low impact on the overall Balance Sheet of Man United. 
Deferred Revenue mainly regards the anticipated recognition of Commercial Revenue, such as 
Chevrolet and the Retail and Merchandise contracts. In 2016, it has diminished in percentage of 
Commercial turnover (from ~95% to ~70%), because Man United only recognizes the guaranteed 
minimum level of turnover assured in the Adidas Contracts, which was much lower in 2015, than the 
actual turnover, unlike in the previous years with the Nike contract. In the future, the Management 
expects the Adidas contracts to keep generating similar amounts of revenues, especially with the 
hiring of such expensive players like Ibrahimovic and Pobga. 
6.6. Net Debt 
Man United’s Net Debt comprises Cash, Borrowings and financial derivatives.  
 
Table 8 – Man United’s historical Net Debt 
As of the date of this valuation (30th June 2016), the Net Debt amounts to £(263k).  
Net Debt Historical
(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Cash and Cash Equivelants 66 156 229
Derivatives financial instruments (Net) (2) (6) (2)
Derivatives (Assets) - 0 12
Derivatives (Liabilities) (2) (6) (13)
Borrowings (342) (411) (490)
Long-Term (327) (410) (485)
Short-Term (15) (0) (6)
Net Debt (278) (261) (263)
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6.7. Non-Operational Assets and Liabilities 
Man United’s NOAP consists of deferred taxes, long term payables and receivables and an Investment 
Property.  
 
Table 9 – Man United’s historical NOAL 
Long-term payables and receivables were reclassified by the author due to their maturity, which is 
perceived as no longer being operational. 
The Investment Property refers to Manchester International Freight Terminal, at RoadTrafford Park. 
It is considered by the Management as not necessary for the current activity of the club. In 2015 was 
subject to an independent RICS valuation, and was considered as being registered at fair value. 
7. Discounted Cash Flow 
As mentioned before, the author chose DFC rather than other methods to evaluate Man United, based 
on the expectation of stable capital structure, which is aligned with the Management beliefs and 
historical conditions. 
DCF might be built either on FCFF or FCFE, which in the end should yield similar results. 
Nonetheless, and based on the stated assumption of stable capital structure, the author perceived no 
added value in using FCFE. 
The formula of FCFF is as follows: 
FCFF = NOPLAT + Depreciation - ∆NWC – CAPEX 
In the end, the valuation of a company’s equity is given by the sum of all Cash Flows, both in the 
explicit period and the terminal value, added up to Net Debt and Non-Operational Assets and 
Liabilities. 
Non-Operational Assets and Liabilities Historical
(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Assets
Trade receivables of players' sales (>1year) 21 3 10
Other Trade Receivables (Long-Term) 101 120 142
Investment Property 14 14 13
Non-Operational Assets 135 137 166
Liabilities
Trade paybles of players' registration (>1year) (39) (47) (75)
Deferred Revenue (Long-Term) (16) (22) (39)
Other Trade Payables (Long-Term) (42) (48) (41)
Non-Operational Liabilities (97) (116) (155)
Non-Operational Assets and Liabilities 38 20 10
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7.1. Scenarios 
Naturally, sports clubs’ financial performance is intrinsically correlated with theirs sports 
performance. Even though one cannot predict future performances it is possible to create scenarios to 
serve as proxies to represent such expectations. 
As mentioned before, 3 scenarios were considered, which are aligned with historical performance and 
the Management expectations and beliefs.  
In order to compute a final DCF valuation (which will later be subject to Sensitivity Analysis), 
weights were attributed to each scenario, based on what happened to the club in the past 10 years. 
 
Table 10 – Scenarios’ weight 
 
7.2. The Explicit Period 
Based on the formula stated above, the author computed the FCFF explicitly for the next 4 seasons 
(from jun-17 until jun-20), in all 3 scenarios, as shown in detail on Annex 8.  
The FCFF evolution on the 3 scenarios is as follows: 
 
Figure 6 – FCFF evolution (explicit period) 
7.3. The Terminal Value 
The Terminal Value, as explained in the Literature Review, can be calculated in different ways.  
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As for Man United, since there are no expectations that the club will cease its activity, the most 
commonly accepted formula will be used:  
 
To do so, it is necessary that the FCFF of the Explicit period are already at “cruising-speed”, which 
is the case of Man United. 
It is of the outmost importance that the long-term growth rate chosen accurately assesses the growth 
potential of the firm, without exceeding the growth limitations of the market where it operates. It is 
very unlikely for a company to grow more in the long-term than the country of the market where it 
operates, since its turnover comes from those consumers. 
The growth rate must be aligned with the growth expectations for the UK, since most Man United’s 
turnover comes from that same region. 
In the following table, the author presents the estimations for GDP growth. The rate of the last 
available year was the one chosen for g. 
 
Table 11 – UK Inflation (IMF) 
According to the industry best practices and to guarantee the company’s operations run smoothly in 
perpetuity, the author applied the following methods: 
 CapEx was considered to be (Dep. + Amort)*(1+g) 
 NCW = WC2020*(1+g) 
Additionally, turnover for Terminal Value in each scenario was computed by applying the growth 
rate to the average of all the years in the explicit period, predicting sports performance like in cyclical 
companies. 
7.4. Man United’s Value 
As of the date of this valuation the market quoted Man United’s shares at 12.9£, which leads to the 
conclusion that Man United’s shares are slightly undervalued. 
Inflation @ UK (by IMF)
2017 2018 2019 2020
2,5% 2,6% 2,0% 2,0%
Equity Valuation – Manchester United PLC 
- 40 - 
 
 
Table 12 – Valuation Results 
7.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity analysis is a very useful tool to assess the impact of certain variables variation, in the 
value of a company. 
Nonetheless, it is slight judgmental regarding the choice of which variables to analyze. In the case of 
Man United the author will perform two distinct sensitivity analysis: 
i. Growth and WACC: these 2 variables are crucial in the determination of the terminal value 
of a company, which comprises most of the firm’s value. Hence, it is very to determine 
thoroughly both components and test slight variations in order to understand the impact 
on the overall value. 
 
Table 13 – WACC and growth sensitivity analysis 
As one may observe, the impact of change in growth is greater than the impact of a change in the 
WACC. Hence, it is incredibly important for Man United’s Management to achieve growth, even 
with slight increases in risk. 
Equity Valuation @ 30 June 2016
(£'€) A B C W.A.
Explicit Period 224 232 215 225
Terminal Value 2.255 2.263 2.032 2.235
Enterprise Value 2.479 2.495 2.247 2.461
Non-Operational Assets and Liabilities
Net Debt
Equity Value 2.227 2.243 1.995 2.208
# shares (M)






g (%) 3,9% 4,1% 4,4% 4,6% 4,9%
1,75% 2.672 2.468 2.236 2.020 1.883
2,00% 2.625 2.480 2.461 2.223 2.038
2,25% 3.573 3.100 2.739 2.454 2.223
Equity Value
WACC
g (%) 3,9% 4,1% 4,4% 4,6% 4,9%
1,75% 2.420 2.215 1.983 1.768 1.631
2,00% 2.373 2.228 2.208 1.971 1.786
2,25% 3.320 2.848 2.486 2.201 1.971
Value per share
WACC
g (%) 3,9% 4,1% 4,4% 4,6% 4,9%
1,75% 14,8 13,5 12,1 10,8 9,9
2,00% 14,5 13,6 13,5 12,0 10,9
2,25% 20,2 17,4 15,2 13,4 12,0
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ii. Players’ wages (as % of turnover) and Players’ registration investment: The first 
represents almost half of Man United’s turnover and the second is the biggest risk of Man 
United’s long-term growth strategy, according to Vice Chairman Ed Woodward. 
 
Table 14 – Players’ wages and capex sensitivity analysis 
One may conclude that both variables have a large impact on firm’s value. Hence, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Man United must pay extreme attention to which expensive players to buy each season, 
as part of its commercial and sports very risky strategy. 
7.6. DCF Conclusion 
The DCF is the most common and accurate method in order to assess firm’s value. With the 
assumptions made and the weighted average of scenarios created, the author achieved a firm value of 
£2.461M, representing £13.5 per share and meaning that Man United shares are quoting below their 
target price. 
Additionally, the sensitivity analysis allowed us to understand that the combination of the investment 
made on players (acquisition and wages) is one of the most important variables in Man United’s firm 
value. For this reason, guaranteeing that those players have impact on the club’s sports performance, 
and consequently, financial performance is the main challenge that the Management of Man United’s 
faces in the upcoming years. 
8. Multiples Valuation 
As mentioned before, Multiples valuation is a very useful tool as a complement to a more thorough 
valuation technique, like intrinsic or profitability models, or as a preliminary value analysis. In this 
Enterprise Value
Capex (Investment in Players' registration)
wages (%) 19,0% 20,0% 21,0% 4,6% 4,9%
46,00% 2.822 2.518 2.382 1.970 2.033
47,50% 2.775 2.530 2.461 2.173 2.188
49,00% 3.723 3.150 2.746 2.404 2.373
Equity Value
WACC
g (%) 19,0% 20,0% 21,0% 4,6% 4,9%
46,00% 2.570 2.265 2.130 1.718 1.781
47,50% 2.523 2.278 2.208 1.921 1.936
49,00% 3.470 2.898 2.494 2.151 2.121
Value per share
WACC
g (%) 19,0% 20,0% 21,0% 4,6% 4,9%
46,00% 15,7 13,8 13,0 10,5 10,9
47,50% 15,4 13,9 13,5 11,7 11,8
49,00% 21,2 17,7 15,2 13,1 12,9
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section, the author presents the value of Man United according to the most widely accepted Multiples, 
in order to triangulate the results obtained in the DCF valuation. 
The first step towards an accurate Multiples Valuation starts with a careful selection of the firm’s 
peer group. The reckoning of Man United’s peer group uses a mixture of both analytical and 
theoretical approaches. The first step was to take in consideration sports clubs, in Europe, which are 
publicly traded.  
 
Table 15 – European publicly trated clubs 
To ensure no major market players stay out of the peer analysis, an internal competitors’ report should 
be used. According to Man United’s Management all major publicly traded players were already 
accounted on the first list. 
At this point, the cluster analysis was executed. To do so, the choice of variables is determinant. The 
variables selected - Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Debt to Total Assets, EV/ EBITDA and 
EBITDA/Sales - are representative of 3 of the most important components of value creation: firm's 
capital structure, profitability and margins. Additionally, should be noted that 3 centroids were 
randomly chosen to perform the analysis. This method led to a final peer group of 5 firms consisting 
of Juventus, Arsenal, Borussia, Galatasaray and Fenerbahce. 
The Multiple used to access the value of Manchester United is the Enterprise Value to EBITDA, 
which is considered “the best multiple for comparing valuations across companies”. Multiples based 
on earnings and sales such as the P/E and P/sales do not account for firms’ capital structures. The 
author tested these multiples and all yielded unreasonable results, due to the drawbacks mentioned in 
the Literature Review. Hence, the author perceives no added value to include them on this analysis. 
When computing EV/EBITA one should pay special attention to the EBITA figure, which must be 
adjusted to non-operational income and expenses and computed in a forward-looking way.  
Publicly Traded Sports Clubs - Europe
Name Country
Juventus Italy
Sport Lisboa e Benfica Portugal
Futebol Clube do Porto Portugal
Fenerbahce Turkey




Sporting Club de Portugal Portugal
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To estimate EBITDA (n+1) for the peer group of Manchester United the author resorted to 
Bloomberg. The estimate for Manchester United was taken from the DCF valuation, presented in the 
previous chapter. 
 
Table 16 – Multiples valuation (EV/EBITDA) 
The Multiples valuation gives us a good insight to the peer group and to the market perception of the 
industry in general. However, in the case of football clubs, a Multiples valuation is hard to perform 
due to the low number of public companies and its structural differences among countries. The 
average EV/ EBITDA multiple of 12x presents an incredibly high standard deviation, which 
decreases our confidence on the result. However, the valuation still allows to conclude that Man 
United’s shares are indeed undervalued, in accordance with the DCF method. 
9. Valuation Comparison 
There are some financial institutions continuously analyzing Man United’s shares. From all the 
reports obtained, the author chose an Equity Research, performed by Alexander Mees, Head of UK 
Small and Mid-Cap Research at J. P. Morgan. 
J.P. Morgan valuates Man United using two methodologies: DCF (FCCF) and Multiples, which ties 
with the methodologic decisions of the author. 
 











EBITDA Man United @30-06-2017 187
Entreprise Value 2.239
Net Debt & NOAL (252)
Equity Value 1.987
# shares 164
Value per share 12,1
Market Price (Closing) 11,9
Conclusion Undervalued
Value per share @ 30 June 2016
(£) DCF Multiples Target Price
JP Morgan 18,1 10,9 14,5
Author 13,5 12,1 13,5
Market Price (Closing) 11,9
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J.P. Morgan’s report also concludes that Man United’s shares are undervalued, yielding a buy 
recommendation. To achieve a final target price of 14.5£, they averaged (50%/50%) the results of the 
Multiples and the DCF valuations. On the other side, the author issued a final target price of 13.5£, 
only resorting to the DCF analysis, for the reasons explained before in section 8 of this report. 
9.1. Multiples Comparison 
J. P. Morgan valuates Man United’s through the EV/EBITDA multiple, exactly as the author, 
however it is the only common aspect. As a peer group, J.P. Morgan selected Discovery 
Communications, Madison Square Garden, Timer Warner, Twenty-First Century Fox and Walt 
Disney, meaning that it classifies Man United as a pure entertainment and media company, which is 
quite unrealistic.  
Man United is a sports club, quite dependent of its sports performance and not only of its broadcast 
and merchandise contracts, explaining why J. P. Morgan obtained a multiple of 9.6x, much lower 
than the author’s 12.0x and a target price of 10.9£, much lower comparing with their valuation results 
using DCF. 
9.2. DCF Comparison 
Methodology 
The main difference between the methodology used by the author’s and J. P.  Morgan’s regards the 
use of valuation scenarios. On the one side, the author resorted to 3 scenarios, serving a proxy to 
different performances in the Premiere League and in the Champions League, which have weighted 
weights in the final valuation. On the other side, J. P. uses only one base scenario that considers that: 
i. Man United has consistently good performances on the Champions League; 
ii. Man United always finishes on Top 2 of the Premiere League; 
iii. All commercial and merchandise contracts are successfully renewed; and 
iv. There are no severe players’ injuries.  
 
Table 18 – DCF Valuation Comparison 
DCF - Base Case vs. J.P.Morgan
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19
Author JP Author JP Author JP0
Revenue 546 535 559 589 569 610
Commercial 282 274 295 290 306 305
Broadcasting 140 162 140 196 140 200
Matchday 124 99 124 103 124 1050
Adjusted EBITDA 187 175 191 200 195 2040
Capex 120 129 123 n/d 125 n/d
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Revenues 
Commercial Revenue is quite alike between this report and J. P. Morgan’s, as both assume the 
successful renegotiation of all major sponsorship and merchandise contracts, namely, with Chevrolet 
and Adidas. 
J. P. Morgan’s considers a relevant increase in the broadcasting revenue between 2017 and 2018, 
which they perpetuate. FA has announced that Domestic Premier League rights were renegotiated, 
and will suffer an increase of 70%. Nonetheless, the increase will be much more gradual than what J. 
P. Morgan considers. 
The scenarios developed by the author consider good performances at the Champions League level, 
resulting in higher Matchday revenue. On the other side, J. P. Morgan is more conservative regarding 
champions league performance. 
EBITDA 
The lower EBITDA assumed by the author from 2018 onwards arises from higher Personnel 
Expenses. In the author’s opinion, J.P. Morgan does not consider that hiring expensive players leads 
not only to higher Capex but also to considerably higher wages. This is the main reason why the target 
price of the author differs from the J.P. Morgan’s one. 
Capex 
Capex levels are quite similar as both DCF’s assume the constant reinvestment in expensive players, 
as part of the strategy being implement by Vice Chairman Ed Woodward. 
WACC and Growth Rate 
 
Table 19 – Wacc, g and Beta Comparison 
J. P. Morgan dos not disclose the source of the Terminal Growth rate neither the decomposition of 
the WACC rate. As for the Levered Beta, the lower value arises from the fact that Media & 
Entertainment companies are, in general, less leveraged than football clubs. 
10. Value at Risk (VaR) 
As mentioned in the Literature Review, the computation of VaR may be performed through the Monte 
Carlo simulation.  
DCF Comparison vs. J.P.Morgan
Author JP0
Terminal Grow th Rate (g) 2,0% 2,5%0
WACC 4,4% 8,3%0
Levered Beta 0,85 0,75
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This technique relies on deterministic principles, i.e., if one performs a process repeatedly, the 
average of the results obtained is a good enough proxy to what to expected in the future (within certain 
levels of confidence, evidently). Mathematically, it translates into a variance covariance matrix and 
the data used to build the matrix will be the daily stock returns of Man United, from July 2006 to June 
2016.  
The process starts by simulating a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation equal to the 
sample and generated 10.000 numbers (cases). 
Then, is necessary to check for normality. To do so, the author conducted a Jarque-Bera test that 
yielded a statistic of 0,7, meaning one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the returns follow a 
normal distribution with a degree of confidence of 90% (and a Chi-Square critical value of 4,62). 
After the normality is checked, one may generate VaR using different confidence levels, as presented 
below.  
 
Table 20 – VaR results 
When used together with the remaining valuation techniques, VaR is a very useful tool to have a 
better understanding the riskiness of the target price obtained, allowing to understand how much of 
the value is at risk, if the stakeholder decides to invest. 
11. Conclusion 
On this report, the author started by explaining all widely-accepted valuation techniques, and how to 
adapt them to specific case studies (literature review). Then, the football industry and Man United’s 
historic performance and outlook were presented, allowing to better determine the assumptions 
comprised in the valuation scenarios. 
Since Man United has no defined policies on dividends distribution and is expected to maintain its 
target Debt/Equity Ratio, the author decided to use DFC (FCFF), also resorting to Multiples to cross-
check the results. Considering that sports clubs’ financial performance is in-depth correlated with the 
performance on the pitch, the author built 3 valuation scenarios, using a weighted-average to assess 
the ultimate firm’s value. 
This method yielded a target price of £13,5, implying that the company is undervalued at the date of 
this report (Market Price = 11.9£). The Multiples valuation yielded a target price of 12.1£, lower than 
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the value obtained through DCF, and influenced by the low number of public companies and 
structural differences among countries, yet also concluding Man United is undervalued. 
Next, the author compared its valuation with an Equity Research performed by J. P. Morgan’s 
analysts. Out of the ER it was possible to conclude that the underlying assumptions on DCF are quite 
similar, however, the Multiples valuation differs considerably, due to the use of very different peer 
groups. Their report also concludes Man United’s shares to be undervalued (Target Price = 14.5£). 
In the end, the author also computed VaR for Man United to better assess the riskiness of the target 
price obtained. 
In the end, this report concludes Man United to be undervalued, based both on the author’s work and 
















Equity Valuation – Manchester United PLC 
- 48 - 
 
12. Annex 
Annex 1: Historical Comprehensive Income Statement 




(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Commercial 189 197 268
% grow th n/a 4,1% 36,2%
Sponsorships 155 160
% grow th n/a 3,4%
Retail & Merchandise 32 97
% grow th n/a 207,9%
Mobile & Content 10 11
% grow th n/a 4,8%
Broadcasting 136 108 140
% grow th n/a (20,7%) 30,4%
Broadcasting - FAPL 108 100
% grow th n/a (7,1%)
Broadcasting - UEFA Competitions - 40
% grow th n/a n/a
Matchday 108 91 107
% grow th n/a (16,2%) 17,7%
UEFA prizes - 17
% grow th n/a n/a
Season Tickets, Matchday Tickets & Others 91 90
% grow th n/a (0,6%)
Turnover 433 395 515
% grow th n/a (8,7%) 30,4%
Operating Expenses Historical Forecast
(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Variable Costs
Employees Expenses (215) (203) (232)
% turnover 49,6% 51,3% 45,1%
Avg. # w orkers 879 778 810
Expense per w orker 0,24 0,26 0,29
External Suppliers Services (81) (69) (91)
% turnover 18,7% 17,6% 17,7%
Fixed Costs
Auditor's Remunerations (1) (1) (1)
% turnover 0,2% 0,2% 0,1%
Operating Lease Costs (2) (3) (3)
% turnover 0,5% 0,7% 0,5%
Non-Recurring Items (9) (2) (2)
% turnover 2,2% 0,5% 0,4%
Depreciation / Amortization
Depreciation (Tangible Assets) (9) (10) (10)
% turnover 2,0% 2,6% 2,0%
Amortization (55) (100) (108)
% turnover 12,8% 25,2% 20,9%
Operating Expenses (372) (387) (437)
% grow th n/a 4,0% 12,8%
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Annex 2: Historical Comprehensive Balance Sheet 




(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Turnover 433 395 515
Employees Expenses (215) (203) (232)
External Suppliers Services (82) (70) (92)
Operating Lease Costs (2) (3) (3)
Adjusted EBITDA 134 120 189
Non Current / Non Operational Items
Depreciations / Amortizations (64) (110) (118)
EBIT 70 10 71
Corporate Taxes 3 (17) 155
% effective tax rate
NOPLAT 73 (7) 226
Net Working Capital Historical Forecast
(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Trade and Other Receivables (Operational) 104 81 119
DSO Current Op. 73 62 70
Inventories - - 1
% turnover 0,0% 0,0% 0,2%
Current Tax Receivable - 0 -
% turnover 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Working Capital (Assets) 104 81 120
Trade and Other Payables (Operational) (63) (85) (125)
DPO Current Op. 65 94 116
Current Tax Liabilities (3) (2) (7)
% variable costs of Operating Expenses 1,0% 0,8% 2,1%
Deferred Revenue (181) (187) (189)
% commcercial turnover 95,5% 94,8% 70,4%
Working Capital (Liabilities) (247) (273) (320)
Net Working Capital (143) (193) (201)
Investment/(Divestment) in Working Capital n/a 49,8 8,3
Capex Historical Forecast
(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Players' registrations 205 239 244
Amortization (55) (100) (108)
% amort rate 74,4% 95,4%
CapEx n/a (134) (113)
% turnover 33,9% 21,9%
PPE 255 251 246
Depreciation (9) (10) (10)
CapEx n/a (6) (5)
% turnover 2,6% 2,0%
Fixed Assets 459 490 490
Total CapEx (140,1) (118,4)
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Annex 3: Turnover Estimation  




(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Cash and Cash Equivelants 66 156 229
Derivatives financial instruments (Net) (2) (6) (2)
Derivatives (Assets) - 0 12
Derivatives (Liabilities) (2) (6) (13)
Borrowings (342) (411) (490)
Long-Term (327) (410) (485)
Short-Term (15) (0) (6)
Net Debt (278) (261) (263)
Non-Operational Assets and Liabilities Historical
(M'£) jun-14 jun-15 jun-16
Assets
Trade receivables of players' sales (>1year) 21 3 10
Other Trade Receivables (Long-Term) 101 120 142
Investment Property 14 14 13
Non-Operational Assets 135 137 166
Liabilities
Trade paybles of players' registration (>1year) (39) (47) (75)
Deferred Revenue (Long-Term) (16) (22) (39)
Other Trade Payables (Long-Term) (42) (48) (41)
Non-Operational Liabilities (97) (116) (155)
Non-Operational Assets and Liabilities 38 20 10
Turnover Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Commercial 282 295 306 315 321
% grow th 5,2% 4,6% 3,6% 2,8% 2,0%
Sponsorships 164 168 172 175 179
% grow th 2,5% 2,6% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Retail & Merchandise 107 116 123 127 130
% grow th 10,0% 8,0% 6,0% 4,0% 2,0%
Mobile & Content 11 11 12 12 12
% grow th 2,5% 2,6% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Broadcasting 140 160 150 140 148
% grow th (0,3%) 14,3% (6,3%) (6,7%) 5,4%
Broadcasting - FAPL 120 140 120 120 125
% grow th 20,0% 16,7% (14,3%) 0,0% 4,2%
Broadcasting - UEFA Competitions 20 20 30 20 23
% grow th 10,0% 8,0% 6,0% 4,0% 2,0%
Matchday 124 139 167 124 138
% grow th 15,9% 12,1% 20,2% (25,8%) 11,7%
UEFA prizes 24 24 37 24 27
% grow th 41,6% 0,0% 55,3% (35,6%) 13,8%
Season Tickets, Matchday Tickets & Others 100 115 130 100 111
% grow th 2,5% 2,6% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Turnover 546 594 622 578 606
% grow th 5,9% 8,8% 4,8% (7,1%) 4,9%
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Scenario 2: Optimistic Case 
 
Scenario 3: Pessimistic Case 
 
Turnover Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Commercial 282 295 306 315 321
% grow th 5,2% 4,6% 3,6% 2,8% 2,0%
Sponsorships 164 168 172 175 179
% grow th 2,5% 2,6% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Retail & Merchandise 107 116 123 127 130
% grow th 10,0% 8,0% 6,0% 4,0% 2,0%
Mobile & Content 11 11 12 12 12
% grow th 2,5% 2,6% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Broadcasting 140 160 170 160 158
% grow th (0,3%) 14,3% 6,3% (5,9%) (1,6%)
Broadcasting - FAPL 120 140 120 140 130
% grow th 20,0% 16,7% (14,3%) 16,7% (7,1%)
Broadcasting - UEFA Competitions 20 20 50 20 28
% grow th 10,0% 8,0% 6,0% 4,0% 2,0%
Matchday 124 139 197 139 149
% grow th 15,9% 12,1% 41,9% (29,5%) 7,8%
UEFA prizes 24 24 52 24 31
% grow th 41,6% 0,0% 119,1% (54,4%) 29,8%
Season Tickets, Matchday Tickets & Others 100 115 145 115 119
% grow th 2,5% 2,6% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Turnover 546 594 672 613 628
% grow th 5,9% 8,8% 13,2% (8,8%) 2,4%
Turnover Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Commercial 282 295 306 315 321
% grow th 5,2% 4,6% 3,6% 2,8% 2,0%
Sponsorships 164 168 172 175 179
% grow th 2,5% 2,6% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Retail & Merchandise 107 116 123 127 130
% grow th 10,0% 8,0% 6,0% 4,0% 2,0%
Mobile & Content 11 11 12 12 12
% grow th 2,5% 2,6% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Broadcasting 140 140 140 140 140
% grow th (0,3%) 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Broadcasting - FAPL 120 120 120 120 120
% grow th 20,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Broadcasting - UEFA Competitions 20 20 20 20 20
% grow th 10,0% 8,0% 6,0% 4,0% 2,0%
Matchday 124 124 124 124 124
% grow th 15,9% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
UEFA prizes 24 24 24 24 24
% grow th 41,6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Season Tickets, Matchday Tickets & Others 100 100 100 100 100
% grow th 2,5% 2,6% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Turnover 546 559 569 578 584
% grow th 5,9% 2,4% 1,9% 1,5% 1,1%
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Annex 4: Operating Expenses Estimation 
Scenario 1: Base Case 
 




(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Variable Costs
Employees Expenses (259) (282) (296) (275) (288)
% turnover 47,5% 47,5% 47,5% 47,5% 47,5%
Avg. # w orkers
Expense per w orker
External Suppliers Services (97) (105) (110) (102) (107)
% turnover 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7%
Fixed Costs
Auditor's Remunerations (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
% turnover 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Operating Lease Costs (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)
% turnover 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5%
Non-Recurring Items (2) (2) (2) (3) (3)
% turnover 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4%
Depreciation / Amortization
Depreciation (Tangible Assets) (10) (10) (10) (10)
% turnover 1,9% 1,7% 1,7% 1,8%
Amortization (109) (119) (125) (116)
% turnover 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0%
Operating Expenses (481) (522) (547) (509) (402)
% grow th 10,2% 8,6% 4,7% (6,9%) (21,1%)
Operating Expenses Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Variable Costs
Employees Expenses (259) (282) (319) (291) (298)
% turnover 47,5% 47,5% 47,5% 47,5% 47,5%
Avg. # w orkers
Expense per w orker
External Suppliers Services (97) (105) (119) (108) (111)
% turnover 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7%
Fixed Costs
Auditor's Remunerations (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
% turnover 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Operating Lease Costs (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)
% turnover 0,5% 0,5% 0,4% 0,5% 0,5%
Non-Recurring Items (2) (2) (2) (3) (3)
% turnover 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4%
Depreciation / Amortization
Depreciation (Tangible Assets) (10) (10) (10) (10)
% turnover 1,9% 1,7% 1,5% 1,7%
Amortization (109) (119) (135) (123)
% turnover 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0%
Operating Expenses (481) (522) (589) (539) (415)
% grow th 10,2% 8,6% 12,8% (8,6%) (22,9%)
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Scenario 3: Pessimistic Case 
 
Annex 5: NOPLAT Estimation  
Scenario 1: Base Case 
 
Scenario 2: Optimistic Case 
Operating Expenses Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Variable Costs
Employees Expenses (259) (265) (270) (275) (278)
% turnover 47,5% 47,5% 47,5% 47,5% 47,5%
Avg. # w orkers
Expense per w orker
External Suppliers Services (97) (99) (101) (102) (103)
% turnover 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7% 17,7%
Fixed Costs
Auditor's Remunerations (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
% turnover 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
Operating Lease Costs (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)
% turnover 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5%
Non-Recurring Items (2) (2) (2) (3) (3)
% turnover 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4%
Depreciation / Amortization
Depreciation (Tangible Assets) (10) (10) (10) (10)
% turnover 1,9% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8%
Amortization (109) (112) (114) (116)
% turnover 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0%
Operating Expenses (481) (493) (502) (509) (387)
% grow th 10,2% 2,4% 1,8% 1,5% (23,9%)
NOPLAT Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Turnover 546 594 622 578 606
Employees Expenses (259) (282) (296) (275) (288)
External Suppliers Services (97) (106) (111) (103) (108)
Operating Lease Costs (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)
Adjusted EBITDA 187 203 213 198 207
Non Current / Non Operational Items
Depreciations / Amortizations (120) (129) (135) (126) -
EBIT 67 74 78 71 207
Corporate Taxes (13) (15) (16) (14) (41)
% effective tax rate 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0%
NOPLAT 54 59 63 57 166
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Scenario 3: Pessimistic Case 
 
Annex 6: Net Working Capital Variation 






(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Turnover 546 594 672 613 628
Employees Expenses (259) (282) (319) (291) (298)
External Suppliers Services (97) (106) (120) (109) (112)
Operating Lease Costs (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)
Adjusted EBITDA 187 203 231 210 215
Non Current / Non Operational Items
Depreciations / Amortizations (120) (129) (145) (133) -
EBIT 67 74 86 77 215
Corporate Taxes (13) (15) (17) (15) (43)
% effective tax rate 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0%
NOPLAT 54 59 68 61 172
NOPLAT Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Turnover 546 559 569 578 584
Employees Expenses (259) (265) (270) (275) (278)
External Suppliers Services (97) (100) (101) (103) (104)
Operating Lease Costs (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)
Adjusted EBITDA 187 191 195 198 200
Non Current / Non Operational Items
Depreciations / Amortizations (120) (122) (124) (126) -
EBIT 67 69 70 71 200
Corporate Taxes (13) (14) (14) (14) (40)
% effective tax rate 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0%
NOPLAT 54 55 56 57 160
Net Working Capital Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20
Trade and Other Receivables (Operational) 126 137 143 133
DSO Current Op. 70 70 70 70
Inventories 1 1 1 1
% turnover 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2%
Current Tax Receivable - - - -
% turnover 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Working Capital (Assets) 127 138 144 134
Trade and Other Payables (Operational) (114) (124) (130) (121)
DPO Current Op. 116 116 116 116
Current Tax Liabilities (8) (8) (9) (8)
% variable costs of Operating Expenses 2,1% 2,1% 2,1% 2,1%
Deferred Revenue (199) (208) (215) (221)
% commcercial turnover 70,4% 70,4% 70,4% 70,4%
Working Capital (Liabilities) (320) (340) (354) (350)
Net Working Capital (194) (203) (210) (216)
Investment/(Divestment) in Working Capital (7,0) 8,7 7,1 6,5
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Scenario 2: Optimistic Case 
 









Net Working Capital Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20
Trade and Other Receivables (Operational) 126 137 155 141
DSO Current Op. 70 70 70 70
Inventories 1 1 1 1
% turnover 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2%
Current Tax Receivable - - - -
% turnover 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Working Capital (Assets) 127 138 156 142
Trade and Other Payables (Operational) (114) (124) (141) (128)
DPO Current Op. 116 116 116 116
Current Tax Liabilities (8) (8) (9) (8)
% variable costs of Operating Expenses 2,1% 2,1% 2,1% 2,1%
Deferred Revenue (199) (208) (215) (221)
% commcercial turnover 70,4% 70,4% 70,4% 70,4%
Working Capital (Liabilities) (320) (340) (365) (358)
Net Working Capital (194) (203) (209) (216)
Investment/(Divestment) in Working Capital (7,0) 8,7 6,6 6,7
Net Working Capital Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20
Trade and Other Receivables (Operational) 126 129 131 133
DSO Current Op. 70 70 70 70
Inventories 1 1 1 1
% turnover 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2%
Current Tax Receivable - - - -
% turnover 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Working Capital (Assets) 127 130 132 134
Trade and Other Payables (Operational) (114) (117) (119) (121)
DPO Current Op. 116 116 116 116
Current Tax Liabilities (8) (8) (8) (8)
% variable costs of Operating Expenses 2,1% 2,1% 2,1% 2,1%
Deferred Revenue (199) (208) (215) (221)
% commcercial turnover 70,4% 70,4% 70,4% 70,4%
Working Capital (Liabilities) (320) (333) (342) (350)
Net Working Capital (194) (203) (210) (216)
Investment/(Divestment) in Working Capital (7,0) 9,1 7,3 6,0
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Annex 7: Capital Expenditures (Capex) 
Scenario 1: Base Case 
 
Scenario 2: Optimistic Case 
 




(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20
Players' registrations 249 255 261 267
Amortization (109) (119) (125) (116)
% amort rate 95,4% 95,4% 95,4% 95,4%
CapEx (115) (125) (131) (121)
% turnover 21,0% 21,0% 21,0% 21,0%
PPE 240 235 229 224
Depreciation (10) (10) (10) (10)
CapEx (5) (5) (5) (5)
% turnover 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Fixed Assets 490 490 491 491
Total CapEx (120) (130) (136) (127)
Capex Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20
Players' registrations 249 255 262 268
Amortization (109) (119) (135) (123)
% amort rate 95,4% 95,4% 95,4% 95,4%
CapEx (115) (125) (141) (129)
% turnover 21,0% 21,0% 21,0% 21,0%
PPE 240 235 229 224
Depreciation (10) (10) (10) (10)
CapEx (5) (5) (5) (5)
% turnover 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Fixed Assets 490 490 491 492
Total CapEx (120) (130) (147) (134)
Capex Forecast
(M'£) jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20
Players' registrations 249 255 260 266
Amortization (109) (112) (114) (116)
% amort rate 95,4% 95,4% 95,4% 95,4%
CapEx (115) (117) (120) (121)
% turnover 21,0% 21,0% 21,0% 21,0%
PPE 240 235 229 224
Depreciation (10) (10) (10) (10)
CapEx (5) (5) (5) (5)
% turnover 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0%
Fixed Assets 490 490 490 490
Total CapEx (120) (123) (125) (127)
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Annex 8: Free Cash Flow (FCFF) 
Scenario 1: Base Case 
 
Scenario 2: Optimistic Case 
 
Scenario 3: Pessimistic Case 
 
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF)
000'€ jun-14 jun-15 jun-16 jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Turnover 433 395 515 546 594 622 578 597
% grow th n/a (8,7%) 30,4% 5,9% 8,8% 4,8% (7,1%) 2,0%
Adjusted EBITDA 134 120 189 187 203 213 198 204
% EBITDA margin 31,0% 30,3% 36,6% 34,2% 34,2% 34,2% 34,2% 34,2%
Depreciations / Amortizations (120) (129) (135) (126) (129)
EBIT 67 74 78 71 75
% EBIT margin 12,3% 12,5% 12,6% 12,4% 12,6%
Corporate Taxes (13) (15) (16) (14) (15)
% effective tax rate 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0%
NOPLAT 54 59 63 57 60
% turnover 9,8% 10,0% 10,0% 9,9% 10,1%
Depreciations / Amortizations 120 129 135 126 129
Investment/(Divestment) in Working Capital (7) 9 7 7 4
Capex (120) (130) (136) (127) (131)
FCFF (Free Cash Flow) 46 67 68 63 62
% turnover 8,5% 11,3% 11,0% 10,9% 10,4%
Period 0,5 1,5 2,5 3,5
Discount period 0,98 0,94 0,90 0,86 36,34
Discounted FCFF 45 63 62 54 2.255
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF)
000'€ jun-14 jun-15 jun-16 jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Turnover 433 395 515 546 594 672 613 618
% grow th n/a (8,7%) 30,4% 5,9% 8,8% 13,2% (8,8%) 2,0%
Adjusted EBITDA 134 120 189 187 203 231 210 212
% EBITDA margin 31,0% 30,3% 36,6% 34,2% 34,2% 34,3% 34,2% 34,2%
Depreciations / Amortizations (120) (129) (145) (133) (136)
EBIT 67 74 86 77 76
% EBIT margin 12,3% 12,5% 12,7% 12,5% 12,3%
Corporate Taxes (13) (15) (17) (15) (15)
% effective tax rate 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0%
NOPLAT 54 59 68 61 61
% turnover 9,8% 10,0% 10,2% 10,0% 9,8%
Depreciations / Amortizations 120 129 145 133 136
Investment/(Divestment) in Working Capital (7) 9 7 7 4
Capex (120) (130) (147) (134) (138)
FCFF (Free Cash Flow) 46 67 73 67 62
% turnover 8,5% 11,3% 10,9% 10,9% 10,1%
Period 0,5 1,5 2,5 3,5
Discount period 0,98 0,94 0,90 0,86 36,34
Discounted FCFF 45 63 66 58 2.263
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF)
000'€ jun-14 jun-15 jun-16 jun-17 jun-18 jun-19 jun-20 TV
Turnover 433 395 515 546 559 569 578 574
% grow th n/a (8,7%) 30,4% 5,9% 2,4% 1,9% 1,5% 2,0%
Adjusted EBITDA 134 120 189 187 191 195 198 196
% EBITDA margin 31,0% 30,3% 36,6% 34,2% 34,2% 34,2% 34,2% 34,2%
Depreciations / Amortizations (120) (122) (124) (126) (129)
EBIT 67 69 70 71 68
% EBIT margin 12,3% 12,3% 12,3% 12,4% 11,8%
Corporate Taxes (13) (14) (14) (14) (14)
% effective tax rate 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 20,0%
NOPLAT 54 55 56 57 54
% turnover 9,8% 9,8% 9,9% 9,9% 9,4%
Depreciations / Amortizations 120 122 124 126 129
Investment/(Divestment) in Working Capital (7) 9 7 6 4
Capex (120) (123) (125) (127) (131)
FCFF (Free Cash Flow) 46 64 63 62 56
% turnover 8,5% 11,4% 11,1% 10,8% 9,7%
Period 0,5 1,5 2,5 3,5
Discount period 0,98 0,94 0,90 0,86 36,34
Discounted FCFF 45 60 57 54 2.032
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Annex 9: Valuation Summary 
Scenario 1: Base Case 
 
Scenario 2: Optimistic Case 
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Equity Valuation @ 30 June 2016
(£'€) Value %
Explicit Period 224 9,0%
Terminal Value 2.255 91,0%
Enterprise Value 2.479




Value per share ('£) 13,6
Equity Valuation @ 30 June 2016
(£'€) Value %
Explicit Period 232 9,3%
Terminal Value 2.263 90,7%
Enterprise Value 2.495




Value per share ('£) 13,7
Equity Valuation @ 30 June 2016
(£'€) Value %
Explicit Period 215 9,6%
Terminal Value 2.032 90,4%
Enterprise Value 2.247




Value per share ('£) 12,2
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